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The prohibition on territorial conquest is a cornerstone of the international legal order. The United Nations Charter bans the use or threat of force as a tool of international relations, even when used to rectify prior injustices. The sole exception is self-defense.
Thus territory taken by force has the status of ill-gotten gains, and cannot be kept by the victor.
An important corollary is that third-party states cannot recognize the sovereignty of the conqueror or otherwise treat the acquisition as illegal.
1 Given the stillbirth of the U.N. collective security system, nonrecognition is one of the few realistic ways the international community has sanctioning deterring conquerors. This much is taken as axiomatic in international law. Indeed, the anti-conquest norm and its nonrecognition corollary are so important that in the view of most international lawyers, even conquest through lawful self-defense against an aggressor is forbidden.
Despite the Charter, nations sometimes acquire or try to acquire territory through force. The standard response of international lawyers to violations of international norms is to stress that such behavior does not prove the absence or weakness of the norm.
What's important for assessing a norm's vitality is the international legal community's and 18 forcible conquests by existing states after the adoption of the U.N Charter. 5 overwhelming international acceptance; these interestingly include both conquests of entire nations. 7 The majority of conquests receive no clear international response.
8
Taking the conquests at their smallest number, international condemnation is found in less than one-quarter; and international approval is at least at common as rejection, though acquiescence accounts for at least half the cases. Thus a country that can successfully conquer and hold territory for a year has little likelihood of facing international condemnation. Nor does there appear to be, at first glance, a connection between the magnitude of the conquest and the reaction, except that very small acquisitions will likely be met with indifference.
Notably, there has not been any successful conquests since 1975. On the other hand, it seems the period since then has seen numerous invasions that created de fact control of nominally independent states dependent on the conqueror. 9 Such pseudoconquests do not fall within the scope of this project, and thus one can only conjecture at whether they have increased as a result of the non-acquisition norm.
